Results

Icône de l'outil pédagogique Farm level

The model results show that few alternative activities are adopted in the farm type 2 cereal/fallow (FT2). This implies that the penalty of 3% is not enough to force this farm type to respect the cross-compliance condition. In fact, only 5 ha (less than 10% of total cereal area) of cereals are cultivated by adopting alternative management. Thus, no significant change is observed for the nitrate leaching when the Nitrate Directive scenario is compared to the baseline (Table 2). In contrast, the response of farm types 1 and 3 to the Nitrate Directive scenario is completely different. The cross-compliance restriction was fulfilled and the whole agricultural area was devoted to alternative activities. This implies that the loss of income induced by the adoption of the alternative activities is less than 3% of the premium received in the baseline scenario. Consequently, the nitrate leaching decreased by 40% and 26% respectively for the farm type 1 and 3 (For more detail see Louhichi et al., 2008).

Economic and environmental indicators

Nitrate Directive (% change to baseline scenario)

FT1

(cereal)

FT2

(cereal/fallow)

FT3

(mixed)

Farm income (1000€)

-1%

-1%

-1%

Premium (1000€)

0%

-4%

0%

Nitrate leaching (kgN-NO3/ha)

-40%

-1%

-26%

 Table 2. Economic and environmental impact of the nitrate directive compared to the CAP reform (baseline scenario) at farm scale.


Icône de l'outil pédagogique Regional level

As expected, the trend obtained at the farm level remains the same at the aggregated level. This implies (1) a partial substitution of current activities by alternative activities, (2) a marginal decrease of farm income and premium due to the penalty and the adoption of alternative activities, and (3) a decline of nitrate leaching attributed to alternative activities which are more efficient in environmental terms.


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